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CAN RIGHTS BE DIFFERENT?: JUSTICE
STEVENS' DISSENT IN MCDONALD V.
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INTRODUCTION

Our nation was founded on the premise of equality.2 The rights
stated within the Bill of Rights are announced for all, and every indi
vidual, regardless of background, education, lineage, or location may
challenge practices that interfere with the equal application of those
1. Kristina M. Campbell received her J.D. from the University of Houston Law
Center in May 2011, graduating summa cum Laude. She received a B.B.A. from Texas
A&M University in May 2008, graduating cum Laude.
Ms. Campbell wishes to thank Professor David Dow of the University of Houston
Law Center, who teaches an annual seminar on the Supreme Court of the United
States , for his inspiration in writing this paper, the editors of this Law Review for their
careful editing of this paper, and finally, her fiance Ben Williams, for his constant
encouragement.
2. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("(A]ll men are
created equal .... "); David A. J.Richards, Constitutional Liberty, Dignity, and Justifi
cation, in THE CoNSTITUTION OF RIGHTS 73, 75 (Michael J. Meyer & William A.
Parent eds., 1992) ("The American idea of constitutionalism rests on a normative po
litical theory of equal inalienable rights ....").
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rights. However, the Bill of Rights and later amendments did not
erase the federalist principles woven into the very fabric of our Constitution.' The Constitution still envisions a system of divided sovereignty, still creates a federal republic where local differences are
valued as fundamental to liberty, and still places police power in the
states alone.
It is within this context that Justice Stevens' dissent in McDonald v.
City of Chicago' is noteworthy.' While the Court's incorporation of
the Second Amendment right to possess a handgun in the home
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause' fundamentally altered the Court's Second Amendment jurisprudence,' it is
the conflict between the fundamental principles of equality and federalism highlighted by Justice Stevens"o that will continue to haunt the
Court in future cases."
This Article responds to Justice Stevens' assertion in McDonald
that rights "need not be identical in shape or scope." 2 Section II of
this Article introduces the events that led to McDonald and outlines
the case's journey from the district court to the Supreme Court. Section III explores the Court's opinion in McDonald, beginning with a
discussion of the state of the law before McDonald in Section III(A).
Section III(B) addresses the facial impact of McDonald, discussing
both the plaintiff residents of Chicago and the Court's incorporation
of the Second Amendment right. Section III(C) explores Justice Stevens' concept of selective incorporation, outlining his depiction of the
proper role of the Bill of Rights in incorporation analysis, noting the
impact this approach has on rights jurisprudence, and finally, arguing
that Justice Stevens' approach has serious doctrinal implications. Balancing federalism and equality concerns, Section III(D) suggests a
means of resolution: consider federalism concerns in the balancing
3. Compare infra note 140 and accompanying text, with Kristina M. Campbell,
Note, Will Equal Again Mean Equal?: Understanding Ricci v. DeStefano, 14 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 385, 387 (2010) (noting the Constitution's commitment to equality).
4. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 117, 133 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
5. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3093 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in judgment).
6. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3020.
7. See infra Part Ill.C.3 (discussing dissent by Justice Stevens in the context of
rights jurisprudence),
8. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.
9. See Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcom, McDonald v. Chicago: Which
Standardof Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun-Control Laws?, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 85, 86
(2010) (referring to Heller and McDonald as "landmark decisions").
10. See infra Section 1I.D.2.
11. See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 48 (2010) ("As a result, relations between federalism and equal protection
have long been strained . . , .").
12. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3093 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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test, rather than in the definition of the right. Section IV concludes
this Article.
II.
A.

THE CASE

The Facts of McDonald v. Chicago

The City of Chicago enacted an ordinance that read, "[n]o person
shall . .. possess ... any firearm unless such person is the holder of a
valid registration certificate for such firearm."" The City also prohibited registration of most handguns, thus effectively banning handgun
possession by nearly all private citizens residing within the City.14 Otis
McDonald and several other Chicago residents that wanted to keep
handguns in their homes, but were prohibited by law from doing so,
sued the City." They sought a declaration that the handgun ban and
several related ordinances violated the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.1 6
B.

The District Court Opinion

McDonald and the Chicago plaintiffs filed suit against the City in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 7
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the City laws
were unconstitutional, finding that because the Seventh Circuit had
upheld the constitutionality of a ban on handguns, the court was
bound by Second Circuit precedent even though more recent case law
may be persuasive of an alternative outcome.'
C.

The Seventh Circuit Opinion

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.' 9 The court relied on nineteenth century cases decided in the wake of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Slaughter13. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026 (citing CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE

§ 8-20-040(a)

(2009)).
14. Id. (citing CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-050(c) (2009)).
15. Id. at 3026-27.

16. Id. at 3027. The petitioners argued that "this right is among the 'privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States"' and, in the alternative, that "the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause 'incorporates' the Second Amendment
right." Id. at 3028.

17. Id. at 3027. The National Rifle Association ("NRA") and two Oak Park residents filed suit challenging a similar Oak Park law, and the NRA and others filed an
additional suit, challenging the Chicago ordinances. Id. The three cases were assigned to the same District Judge. Id.
18. See NRA, Inc. v. Oak Park, 617 F. Supp. 2d 752, 753-54 (N.D. III. 2008). Addressing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the district court noted
that the Court had explicitly refrained from addressing the subject of incorporation of
the Second Amendment. NRA, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 754.
19. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3027.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

3

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 19 [2022], Iss. 3, Art. 5

736

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

House Cases to affirm, and the court declined to predict how the Second Amendment would fare under the Court's modern selective incorporation approach.20
McDonald Before the Supreme Court
1. Justice Alito's Majority Opinion
A five-member majority2 1 of the Supreme Court overruled the
lower court's decision and concluded that the Second Amendment
right is incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and therefore applies to the states.2 2 The Court rejected
the plaintiffs' contention that the Second Amendment was applicable
to the states through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based upon longstanding precedent following the
Slaughter-House Cases.2 3
The majority began their analysis by examining the Court's writings
on the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the states, and they
concluded that the proper starting point for rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment was the Due Process Clause.2 4 Although the
Court deferred to precedent in basing incorporation in the Due Process Clause, the Court did not allow nineteenth century cases that declined to apply the Second Amendment to the states25 to preclude
their consideration of incorporation.2 6
The Court then turned to historical incorporation jurisprudence to
form the foundation of their analysis, noting several fundamental
premises." First, the only rights protected against state infringement
by the Due Process Clause are those rights included in the conception
of due process of law.28 While it was possible that some rights afforded by the Bill of Rights might be safeguarded against state action,
this is not merely because those rights are enumerated in the first
eight amendments.2 9 To determine whether the right is included
within the conception of due process, the Court will inquire whether
the right is "fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system
D.

20. NRA, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 857 (2009).
21. Justice Alito was joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026. Justices Scalia and Thomas filed separate concurring
opinions, which are beyond the scope of this Article. Id. at 3025.
22. Id. at 3050.
23. Id. at 3030-31 (discussing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)).
24. Id. at 3028-31.
25. The Court addresses three nineteenth century cases: Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S.
535 (1894); Presserv. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); and United States v. Cruikshank,92
U.S. 542 (1876).
26. McDonald,130 S. Ct. at 3031. Because these cases preceded the Court's selective incorporation doctrine, the Court reasoned that that incorporation of the Second
Amendment should be reconsidered. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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of justice" and is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."3 Second, the Court noted that it had abandoned any notion
that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states only a "watereddown, subjective version" of the individual in guarantees of the Bill of
Rights; instead, incorporated portions of the Bill of Rights are to be
enforced against the states according to the same standards that protect those rights against federal encroachment.
After applying these fundamental premises, the Court looked to its
decision in Districtof Columbia v. Heller3 2 to find that self-defense is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and further,
that the right to keep and bear arms is among the fundamental rights
necessary to our system of ordered liberty. The Court reaffirmed its
holding in Heller that the scope of the right is not determined by judicial interest balancing.34 Further, the Court stated that the right to
keep and bear arms would not apply to the states in a "watered-down,
subjective version" of the Second Amendment.
After finding that the Due Process Clause protects the right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense, the Court
found the Chicago handgun laws unconstitutional. 6 Based on this
finding, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
2. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Four members of the Court dissented from the judgment,38 and Justice Stevens authored a dissent in which no other members of the
Court joined.3 1 Justice Stevens' dissent was premised on the acceptance of the resolution of the incorporation question in nineteenth century Second Amendment cases and the view that the case presented a
substantive due process question, not a privileges or immunities ques30. Id. at 3034, 3036.
31. Id. at 3035. The Court noted that it would be "incongruous" to apply different
standards "depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court."
Id.
32. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
33. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036, 3042. To reach this conclusion, the Court engaged in a lengthy historical discussion of the Second Amendment and the drafting of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 3036-42.
34. Id. at 3036, 3047.
35. Id. at 3047. However, the Court did repeat its assurances in Heller that recognition of the right to bear arms does not imperil every law regulating firearms. Id.
36. Id. at 3050.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 3088, 3120.
39. Id. at 3088 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also authored a dissent, in
which Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined. Id. at 3120. Discussion of Justice
Breyer's dissent is beyond the scope of this Article.
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tion.4 0 Further, Justice Stevens read the Court's incorporation jurisprudence to hold that the rights protected against state infringement
by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause need not be
identical in shape or scope to the rights protected against federal government infringement under the Bill of Rights.4 1 For Justice Stevens,
the question was not whether the right to keep and bear arms applies
to the states because the Second Amendment has been incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather, whether the particular
right to possess a handgun asserted by petitioners applied to the states
because of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.4 2 Justice Stevens found
no indication in the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence that
the term "liberty" within the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses either the common-law right to self-defense or a right to keep and bear
arms, and further, found no indication that nineteenth century Second
Amendment cases should be overturned.43 As a result, Justice Stevens
would uphold the City's handgun laws."
III.

ANALYSIS

Given that the Due Process Clause has incorporated virtually all
other enumerated rights, the obvious question is what exactly justifies
treating the Second Amendment as the great exception.45

Justice Stevens' dissent in McDonald made clear that the fundamental principles of federalism and equal possession of rights are
often in conflict.4 6 Before deciding whether rights must always be
"identical in shape or scope,""7 it is crucial to not only understand the
Court's incorporation jurisprudence, but to identify the complications
that arise when attempting to reconcile federalism and equality. This
section will address (a) the state of the law before McDonald, (b) the
facial impact of McDonald, (c) Justice Stevens' selective incorporation
analysis, (d) the most advisable solution for reconciling the fundamental principles of equality and federalism in the balancing test, and (e)
response to anticipated critiques.
40. Id. at 3088-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens disagrees with the test
employed by the majority, as he believed the fundamental question is whether the
interest is "comprised within the term liberty." Id. at 3092 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 3093-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens pointed to "(e]lementary considerations of constitutional text and structure" as legitimate reasons to hold the
states to different standards than the federal government, and he argued that perfect
state and federal congruence is necessary only on matters "at the core" of the relevant
constitutional guarantee. Id. at 3093-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 3103 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 3109 (Stevens, J., dissenting). To Justice Stevens, "[t]here was nothing
foreordained about [McDonald's] outcome." Id. at 3119 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. See id. at 3120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Brief for Petitioners, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No.
08-1521), 2009 WL 4378912, at *66.
46. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3101.
47. Id. at 3093 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The State of the Law Before McDonald

The Bill of Rights originally applied only to the federal government.4 8 However, the constitutional amendments adopted following
the Civil War fundamentally altered our nation's federal system and
prompted review of this fundamental precept.4 9 Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment's provision that a state may not deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" provided a
ground for a fresh look at the Bill of Rights.o
In the late nineteenth century, the Court began to consider whether
the Due Process Clause prohibited the states from infringing upon
rights established by the Bill of Rights."' As noted by the Court in
McDonald, there were five primary features of the approach taken
during this era. 2 First, the Court viewed the due process question as
distinct from the question of whether a right was a privilege or immunity of national citizenship, allowing for reconsideration of rights previously found not deserving of protection from state infringement.
Second, the Court held that the only rights protected against state infringement by the Due Process Clause were those rights "of such a
nature that they are included in the conception of due process of
law."5 4 While the Court noted that it was possible that many of the
personal rights safeguarded by the Bill of Rights might also be safeguarded against state action, the Court stated that this was not merely
because those rights were enumerated in the Bill of Rights." Third,
the Court used several different formulations in describing the boundaries of due process during this era,5 6 including references to "immutable principles of justice" 5 and those rights "so rooted in the
48. See Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. 469, 551-52 (1833) ("It is now settled that
those amendments do not extend to the states. . .."); Edmond Cahn, A New Kind of
Society, in THE GREAT RIGHTs 8 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1963) ("[T]he Bill of Rights
originally restricted only the Federal Government.").
49. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3028; accord Clark M. Neily III & Robert J. McNa-

mara, Getting Beyond Guns: Context for the Coming Debate over Privileges or Immunities, 14 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 15, 16 (2009) ("The Fourteenth Amendment represents

a deliberate decision by the people of this nation to make the U.S. Constitution-not
state constitutions and not state officials-the primary guardians of liberty in
America.").

50. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court looked to the Bill of Rights for
guidance in determining the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
51. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031.
52. Id.

53. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908).
54. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031; see, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67
(1947); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,

327 n.4 (1937).

55. Twining, 211 U.S. at 99.
56. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3032 (outlining formulations for the boundaries of
due process).
57. Twining, 211 U.S. at 102.
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traditions and conscience of our people to be ranked as fundamental."" Fourth, the Court did not hesitate to hold that a right stated in
the Bill of Rights failed to meet the test for inclusion and protection
under the Due Process Clause.5 Finally, even when a right set out in
the Bill of Rights was found to fall within the conception of due process, the protection afforded by the Court against state infringement
occasionally differed from the protection provided against abridgement by the federal government.60
An alternative theory of the proper relationship between the Bill of
Rights and the Due Process Clause was championed by Justice Black
during this time, and it has since been promoted by several scholars
and Justices. 61 Based on a belief that the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable against
the states,6 2 this theory suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment
completely incorporated all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
when it was enacted. However, the Court has never embraced Justice Black's total incorporation theory.'
Although the Court has never embraced Justice Black's theory, the
Court began moving in that direction at the beginning of the twentieth
century by adopting the practice of selective incorporation and finding
that the Due Process Clause fully incorporates particular rights contained in the first eight Amendments. 5 Consequently, the Court's de58. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
59. See, e.g., Twining, 211 U.S. at 113 (privilege against self-incrimination).
60. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3032. For example, in Betts v. Brady, the Court held
that, although the Sixth Amendment required the appointment of counsel in all federal criminal cases in which the defendant was unable to afford an attorney, the Due
Process Clause required appointment of counsel in state proceedings only where want
of counsel resulted in a conviction lacking fundamental fairness. Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455,473 (1942). Accord Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28, 33 (1949) (finding
that while the core of the Fourth Amendment was enforceable against the states
under the Due Process Clause, the exclusionary rule does not apply to the states).
61. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights and the FederalGovernment, in THE GREAT
RIGHTs 44 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1963) ("[B]y virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the first ten amendments are now applicable to the states."). See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1964) (noting the Justices that have argued for incorporation of
the entire Bill of Rights).
62. Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional
Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 907 (2001).
63. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
64. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3033.
65. See, e.g., Malloy, 378 U.S. 1; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Accord B. Aubrey Smith, Laying Privileges or Immunities to Rest: McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 161, 165 (2010), available at
http://www.scholarsh65ip.law.duke.edu/djclpp-sidebar/63/ ("[T]he Court has increasingly recognized specific, constitutional rights as binding and protected from intrusion
by both the federal and state government through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause . . . ."). But see Brief for Respondents in Opposition, McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2009) (Nos. 08-1497, 08-1521), 2009 WL 2419169, at
*10 ("[Tlhe Court has flatly rejected '[t]he notion that the due process of law guaran-
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cisions shifted away from the previously discussed characteristics6 6 of
the early nineteenth century. 7 The Court formulated a single test for
the boundaries of due process, asking whether a particular Bill of
Rights guarantee is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and
system of justice." The Court also shed any reluctance to hold that
rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights were protected by the Due
Process Clause. 9 Most importantly to the scope of this Article, the
Court abandoned the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the guarantees of the Bill of Rights in a "watered-down, subjective version," and instead, the Court decisively held that incorporated
Bill of Rights provisions are to be enforced against the states by the
same standards that protect those rights against federal
encroachment.7 0
Before McDonald, the Court had only addressed whether the Second Amendment applied to the states through the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and it had not addressed the question under the Due
Process Clause." In United States v. Cruikshank, the Court wrote that
the right to bear arms "is not a right granted by the Constitution" and
held that the Second Amendment applied only to the federal government and was not protected against state infringement by the Priviteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is shorthand for the first eight amendments
....
(quoting Wolf, 338 U.S. at 26)).
66. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
67. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034.
68. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148-49 n.14 (referring to those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions"). Duncan has been read to suggest that the Court will also look to the right's
historical acceptance in our nation, its recognition by the states, and the nature of the
interest secured by the right. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17, McDonald v. City
of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521). But see Brief for Respondents in
Opposition at 10-11, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2009) (Nos. 081497, 08-1521), 2009 WL 2419169, at *10-11 (commenting that the Court examines
numerous factors: "the right's purpose, function, and efficacy; its origins in English
and American jurisprudence; and its prevalence in and treatment under state constitutions," with "our laws and traditions in the past half century" being most relevant).
69. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034. The Court eventually incorporated almost all
provisions of the Bill of Rights. See id. at nn.12-13 (listing relevant cases).
70. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10-11 (1964) ("It would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared
prosecution . . . ."). However, the Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury does not require a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials.
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1972); accord Michael P. O'Shea, Federalism and the Implementation of the Right to Arms, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 201, 215-16
(2008) (discussing additional examples of remaining partial incorporation). In addition, several members of the Court continued to critique the full incorporation
method. See, e.g., Malloy, 378 U.S. at 15-17 (criticizing the premise that the Due
Process Clause is "a shorthand directive to . . . pick and choose among the provisions
of the first eight Amendments and apply those chosen, freighted with their entire
accompanying body of federal doctrine, to law enforcement in the States").
71. Michael Anthony Lawrence, The Potentially Expansive Reach of McDonald v.
Chicago: Enabling the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. (DE
Novo) 139, 140 (2010).
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leges or Immunities Clause.7 2 As a result, the Second Amendment
had not been incorporated against the states when McDonald reached
the Court.
B.

The Facial Impact of McDonald

The plaintiffs in McDonald, and others like them, are the immediate beneficiaries of the Court's ruling in McDonald, as they are no
longer restricted by Chicago's firearm laws. 7 ' However, the real impact of McDonald stretches further, both in the application of Second
Amendment rights by lower courts and in incorporation jurisprudence." This Section will address the Court's holding read narrowly;
McDonald's impact on incorporation jurisprudence will be discussed
in Section III(C).
In McDonald, the Court inquired whether the Second Amendment
right is "fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of
justice" and is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" to
determine whether it is incorporated against the states under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Because the Court
found the Second Amendment right to possess a handgun fundamental and therefore incorporated against the states, the Court found the
City's ordinances unconstitutional.77 The McDonald Court limited its
holding to the right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose
of self-defense, as recognized in Heller,7 and noted that the right to
keep and bear arms is not "a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.""
Since the Court's ruling in McDonald, lower courts have read McDonald to reaffirm Heller's holding that the Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes,
specifically for self-defense within the home.8 0 Lower courts have also
viewed McDonald's reference to exceptions as a warning not to apply
the Court's holding too broadly, as the right to bear arms is not without limits." For instance, the D.C. Circuit upheld prohibitions on "as72. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876).
73. See Smith, supra note 65, at 166 ("The modern Court has yet to consider
whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is [a] fundamental
right.").
74. Compare McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026 (noting petitioners' claims), with supra
notes 36-37 and accompanying text (noting the Court's holding in McDonald).
75. See infra Part III.B-C.
76. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036, 3042.
77. Id. at 3036.
78. See id. at 3050 ("We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in
Heller.").
79. Id. at 3047 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)).
80. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding
the inquiry to be whether the plaintiff is "qualified to possess a firearm in the first
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sault weapons and large-capacity magazines." 8 2 Lower courts have
noted that McDonald did not elaborate on the level of review for Second Amendment claims, whether against the federal government or a
state. Finally, lower courts have read McDonald to hold that the
Second Amendment applies equally to the federal government and
the states.84
It is useful not only to examine subsequent lower court rulings for
the facial impact of McDonald, but also to examine relevant commentary by legal scholars. Scholars have read McDonald to hold that the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is fully enforceable
against the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 5 and have noted the uncertainty McDonald brings for
local gun regulations." Further, while recognizing that the Due Process Clause provides the basis for incorporation in McDonald, legal
scholars have argued that McDonald leaves open the possibility of future reconsideration of the Slaughter-House Cases and use of the Privileges or Immunities Clause." Finally, legal scholars have debated the
instance"); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91-92 (3rd Cir. 2010) (noting
the limitations to the right); United States v. Pope, 613 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir.
2010) (noting Heller's dictum that recognition of an individual right to keep and bear
arms was not intended to upset "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons"); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 647 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting
McDonald's discussion of "longstanding regulatory measures"). But see Saldinger v.
Santa Cruz Cnty. Super. Ct., No. C 10-3147 SBA PR., 2010 WL 3339512, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 24, 2010) ("McDonald forbids any State from imposing reasonable restrictions on the use of weapons to eject or prevent trespassers.").
82. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2010) ("We have
thus far, like the Supreme Court, declined to wade into the 'levels of scrutiny' quagmire . .. ."). However, at least one court has held that "'longstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms', derived from various historical provisions, as 'presumptively lawful regulatory measures."' United States v. Smith, 742 F. Supp. 2d 855, 858
(S.D. W. Va. 2010).
84. See, e.g., id. at 866 ("In McDonald, the Supreme Court held that the Second
Amendment is fully applicable to the states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause."); Richards v. Cnty. of Yolo, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1174
(E.D. Cal. 2011) ("Rights bestowed under the Second Amendment . . . apply equally
to the federal government and the states."); Saldinger, 2010 WL 3339512, at *4 (citing
McDonald as "extending Heller to the States"); ef Durga v. Bryan, No. 3:10-CV-1 989,
2011 WL 4594281, at *5 n.1 (D. N.J. Sept. 30, 2011) ("McDonald . . . held that Second
Amendment rights are applicable to the States").
85. Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Hector R. Lozada, A Nomination of a Supreme Court
Justice: The Incorporation Doctrine Revisited, 35 OKLA. CITY. U. L. REv. 365, 384
(2010); The Supreme Court,2009 Term-Leading Cases: Incorporationof the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms, 124 HARV. L. REv. 229, 229 (2010) [hereinafter 2009 TermLeading Cases]. Cf Richard Primus, ConstitutionalExpectations, 109 MICH. L. REV.
91, 100 (2010) (noting the "Supreme Court's recent announcement that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to own firearms").
86. Cf Ian W. Henderson, Rights, Regulations, and Revolvers: Baltimore City's
Complex Constitutional Challenge Following District of Columbia v. Heller, 39 U.
BALT. L. REV. 423 (2010) (noting the effect on Baltimore's gun regulations).
87. 2009 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 85, at 234.
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appropriate level of scrutiny for regulations that infringe upon the
right to possess a handgun in the home."
C. Justice Stevens' Selective Incorporation Doctrine
While the majority in McDonald recognized that rights contained
within the Bill of Rights are not protected against state infringement
by the Due Process Clause merely because they are part of the Bill of
Rights," Justice Stevens fully embraced this principle.9 0 Justice Stevens made clear that inclusion in the Bill of Rights is neither necessary
nor sufficient for a right to be judicially enforceable under the Fourteenth Amendment;9" it is merely informative.9 2 Part (1) of this Section will elaborate on Justice Stevens' view of the proper role of the
Bill of Rights in incorporation analysis. Part (2) will highlight the
practical impact of his approach, and Part (3) will contrast his approach with the Court's current rights jurisprudence, noting the doctrinal implications of his approach. Finally, Part (4) will critique
Justice Stevens' dissent in McDonald.
1. The Bill of Rights in Incorporation Analysis
For Justice Stevens, regardless of whether the asserted right is
named within the Bill of Rights, the underlying inquiry is the same:
whether the interest is "comprised in the term liberty" found in the
Fourteenth Amendment.93 Indeed, only those values "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" that contribute to a "fair and enlightened
system of justice" are suitable for substantive due process protection." Justice Stevens' liberty inquiry is not limited to our notion of
ordered liberty, as suggested by the majority,95 but gives liberty a universal character that can be separated from the customs of certain regions, the expectations of a certain group, and the preferences of the
interest's proponents. 6 Further, for Justice Stevens, our history and
tradition are only a starting point for consideration of the suggested
right, as substantive due process "must not be wholly backward look88. See, e.g., generally Rosenthal & Malcom, supra note 9, at 86 (debating the
appropriate level of scrutiny after McDonald).
89. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3031 (2010).
90. Id. at 3097 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 3093 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 3096 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens notes that "the inclusion of
a liberty interest in the Bill of Rights points toward the conclusion that it is of fundamental significance and ought to be enforceable against the States," but he is quick to
find that this does not apply to the Second Amendment. Id. at 3111 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
93. Id. at 3092 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stresses that the Court's
"selective incorporation" doctrine is not simply related to substantive due process; it
is a subset of the doctrine. Id. at 3093 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 3096 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 3034, 3036.
96. Id. at 3096 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ing." 7 Rather than considering current state protection of the right
only as evidence of the right's historical acceptance," Justice Stevens
finds that "respect for the democratic process," by deference to ongoing state experimentation with the right, is a key factor in substantive
due process analysis.99
While the outer bounds of liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment are admittedly "not capable of being fully clarified"
under this approach, Justice Stevens does suggest that substantive due
process only protects "certain types of especially significant personal
interests.""oo He argues that if the majority's assertion that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty embraces only those rights
"so rooted in our history, tradition, and practice as to require special
protection" is correct, then the guarantee is circular-it would do little
more than ratify those rights for which state actors already afford the
most extensive protection."' Within Justice Stevens' framework, a
right's status as protected under our Bill of Rights is little more than
evidence that at one time, one nation, out of the greater universal
society under consideration, included the right within its

Constitution.10 2
2.

Practical Impact on the Second Amendment Right

Justice Stevens explores the outcome of his approach to incorporation in McDonald,10 3 and it is not difficult to imagine the impact of his
approach on an individual right.'0 In general, if incorporation analysis gives little, if any, weight to a right's inclusion in the Bill of Rights,
then it is very possible that a right protected from federal infringement is not judicially enforceable against the states.10 The Second
Amendment right to keep a handgun in the home for self-defense,
97. Id. at 3097 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that the majority
was "seriously mistaken" in finding that the historical pedigree of a right is the sole
determinant of its status under the Due Process Clause. Id.
98. Under traditional rights analysis, consideration of the state action does not
occur until the right is determined and the Court asks whether the action infringing
upon the recognized right is appropriate. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
99. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 3100 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens lists "[slelf-determination,
bodily integrity, freedom of conscience, intimate relationships, political equality, dignity and respect" as "central values . .. implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id.
at 3101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 3097 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. But see supra note 92 (recognizing
Justice Stevens' swift dismissal of the general implication of a right's inclusion in the
Bill of Rights).
103. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3103-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (applying substantive due process doctrine to the Second Amendment).
104. See infra notes 105-20 and accompanying text (discussing the practical
impact).
105. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3103 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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recognized in Heller and addressed at the state level in McDonald,10 6
provides an excellent case study for the impact of Justice Stevens' approach on a specific right.
In McDonald, Justice Stevens phrases the issue as "whether the interest in keeping in the home a firearm of one's choosing . . . is one

that is comprised within the term liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment." 0 7 Instead of finding that the Court's decision in Heller "points
unmistakably to the answer,""os Justice Stevens questions the right
anew through his substantive due process framework.'0 Justice Stevens finds the following factors persuasive: (i) in evaluating the right
to be free from particular gun-control regulations, liberty is on the
side of all interests; (ii) the right to possess a firearm is different in
kind from other liberty interests the Court has recognized under the
Due Process Clause; (iii) the regulations of other advanced democracies undercuts the premise that an expansive right to keep and bear
arms is intrinsic to ordered liberty; (iv) the Second Amendment serves
the structural function of protecting the states from encroachment by
an overreaching federal government, and it was not designed to protect an individual right; (v) states have a long history of regulating
firearms; and (vi) federalism should be allowed to flourish without the
Court's meddling in the area of firearm regulation.)' 0 As a result, Justice Stevens' substantive due process review views the right's protection under the Second Amendment as only one-if even one-factor
considered.'
Justice Stevens not only concludes that it is possible that the Second
Amendment right recognized in Heller is not protected against state
infringement, but also that even if this right is protected by the Due
Process Clause, it "need not be identical in shape or scope to the
right[] protected against Federal Government infringement."1 2 Because the right's inclusion in the Bill of Rights does not, in itself, warrant protection against state infringement, it is not necessary that the
right have precisely the same meaning in both contexts."' While Justice Stevens recognizes the practical benefits that result from treating
rights symmetrically, his conception of the Due Process Clause and
106. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2010), with McDonaId, 130 S. Ct. at 3107.
107. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3107 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 3036.
109. Id. at 3107 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 3107-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. Id. While Justice Stevens addresses the right's protection under the Second
Amendment, he does not do so in light of the Court's opinion in Heller. Id. at 3111
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens emphasizes the purpose for which the right
was codified "to prevent elimination of the militia," and he assigns little importance
to Heller'srecognition of an individual right to keep and bear arms disconnected from
militia service within the Second Amendment. Id.
112. Id. at 3093 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 3094 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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federalism does not warrant such uniformity.1 4 However, Justice Stevens does not illustrate what these different rights might look like in
McDonald, as he concludes that the right to keep a handgun in the
home is protected against federal infringement under Heller but is not
protected against state infringement.'" 5
The impact of Justice Stevens' approach to Second Amendment incorporation is perplexing, if not impractical. At its extreme, if an individual has a federal right to possess a handgun in his home but does
not have a right within any state to possess any type of gun in his
home, then his federal right may never be exercised, regardless of
where he makes his home within the United States." 6 His federal
right to possess a handgun in the home has become meaningless as a
practical matter.' Similarly, if an individual citizen's state right is to
possess only a certain caliber of handgun within the home, or to possess only an unloaded handgun, locked away at all times, within his
home, then he may only exercise his federal right to that extent." 8
Any greater federal right has again become meaningless as a practical
matter." 9 In any event, the individual citizen will only enjoy his right
to possess a handgun to the extent it is recognized against state infringement, regardless of the breadth of his federal right. 2 0 Such an
114. Id. at 3095 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Compare id. at 3103 n.26 (Second Amendment right), with id. at 3107 (finding
no state right).
116. See Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2009) (No. 081521), 2009 WL 4099516, at *7 [hereinafter Eagle Forum Brief] ("The right to selfdefense is a right that is meaningless unless protected against state encroachment.");
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2009)
(No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 2574073, at *3 ("A Second Amendment right valid only
against the federal government is meaningless to Americans disarmed by state officials."). Even Justice Stevens recognizes that "b]ot-for-jot incorporation of a provision may entail greater protection of the right at issue." McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3095
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. See sources cited supra note 116.
118. Cf supra note 116 and accompanying text (noting the effect of a federal right
without a corresponding state right). Under Justice Stevens' approach, another plausible scenario might be that the citizens in certain locales have different rights than
those in other areas and different than that protected against federal infringement by
the Second Amendment. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3093 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Elementary considerations of constitutional text and structure suggest there may be
legitimate reasons to hold state governments to different standards than the Federal
Government in certain areas.") (emphasis added). If this were the case, a citizen's
right to possess a handgun will vary based upon his residence or current location. See
Eagle Forum Brief, supra note 116, at *4 (arguing the right to self-defense is "worth
less if it disappears and reappears during a citizen's road trip across the nation, or as a
citizen relocates from town to town, or state to state.").
119. Cf supra note 116 and accompanying text (noting the effect of a federal right
without a corresponding state right).
120. Cf O'Shea, supra note 70, at 222 (illustrating the disparity in the right to own
a weapon in Wyoming and New Jersey).
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outcome is far from the original design of the Fourteenth
Amendment.12 1
3. Impact on Rights Jurisprudence
The practical impact of Justice Stevens' approach to incorporation
in McDonald is worth exploration, but recognizing this practical impact is not enough. If his approach to incorporation is adopted, current rights jurisprudence will be fundamentally altered.1 22
There is certainly nothing heretical about Justice Stevens' assertion
that the Court has never accepted a total incorporation theory where
the Fourteenth Amendment is deemed to "subsume the provisions of
the Bill of Rights en masse."" The Court has declined to apply any
part of the Seventh Amendment and the Grand Jury Clause to the
states.1 24 Further, the Court has resisted a uniform approach to the
Sixth Amendment's criminal jury guarantee, requiring twelve-member
jury panels and unanimous verdicts in federal trials but not in state
trials.' 2 5 However, these cases are exceptions to the Court's general
trend of treating the Due Process Clause as if it transplants language
from the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment; 26 in all but
these few cases of criminal procedure, the Court has abandoned a
two-track approach to incorporation.12 7 As a result, Justice Stevens'
121. See Amar, supra note 62, at 907 ("The Fourteenth Amendment's framers emphatically proclaimed their intent to make the Bill of Rights applicable against
states."); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporationof the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment, 61 OIo ST. L.J. 1051, 1114 (2000) ("[Tjhe Fourteenth Amendment was
designed to sharply limit the power of the states to abuse the fundamental rights of
American[s].").
122. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing such implications).
123. Compare McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3093-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting), with id. at
3033 ("[Tihe Court has never embraced Justice Black's 'total incorporation'
theory . . . .").

124. See, e.g., Minneapolis & Saint Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 216
(1916) (stating that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (stating that the Grand Jury Clause does not
apply to the states).
125. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972). The Court has repeatedly
declined certiorari to review this case. See, e.g., Bowen v. Oregon, 168 P.3d 1208 (Or.
App. 2007), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 52 (2009). While this denial has no precedential
significant, Justice Stevens notes that the Court "confirm[s] the proposition that the
'incorporation' of a provision of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment
does not, in itself, mean the provision must have precisely the same meaning in both
contexts." McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3094 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 3034-35, nn.12-13 (listing incorporated and unincorporated provisions).
Some have noted that the common characteristic of rights that have not been incorporated is that they are local in nature, where there is little need for national uniformity.
Eagle Forum Brief, supra note 116, at *7.
127. See Motion to File and Brief of Amicus Curiae American Legislative Exchange Council in Support of Petitioners at 6-7, McDonald v. City of Chicago. 130 S.
Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4099519, at *6-7 (noting that unincorporated
rights concern criminal procedure); see supra note 31 and accompanying text. Some
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approach would return the Court to its early incorporation jurisprudence, where recognizing an identical federal and state right is the
exception, not the norm.12 8
While Justice Stevens' suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment
need not adopt a provision of the Bill of Rights in its entirety is hardly
novel,12 9 his suggestion that the content of a right need not be identical in shape or scope is a fundamental departure from incorporation
jurisprudence.'3 0 The Court has firmly rejected the notion that "the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states only a watered-down,
subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of
Rights,"' and instead, it has decisively held that incorporated Bill of
Rights provisions are to be enforced against the states according to
the same standards that protect those federal rights against federal

encroachment. 1 32
Further, Justice Stevens' assertion that the content of a right need
not always be the same directly contrasts with our fundamental rights
jurisprudence."' Calling something a "right" to claim priority and
protection regardless of the kind of normative ground offered has
been characteristic of rights discourse throughout American history.13 4 The most fundamental proposition of our constitutional law

states have historically afforded greater rights to their residents than those required of
the national government by the corresponding federal guarantee. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND -HE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 65, 85 n.66 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1963). However, this Article only addresses the ramifications of defining a right more narrowly in certain areas, and as a
result, analysis of instances of extension are only minimally helpful.
128. See Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250
(1833) (finding that as initially drafted, the Bill of Rights directly constrained only the
federal government).
129. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Hunter & Lozada, supra note 85, at 381 ("There is an implicit assumption, if a right is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . the right will

receive the same protection against state intrusion through the Fourteenth Amendment that it receives through the Bill of Rights."). But see JOSEPH G. COOK ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 14-15 (7th ed. 2009) (exploring "neo-incorporation" views).
131. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964) (quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price,
364 U.S. 264, 275 (1960) (per curiam)).
132. E.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (2010); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
110 (1964). But see Malloy, 378 U.S. at 16-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("compelled
uniformity ... is inconsistent with the purpose of our federal system").
133. See, e.g., DAVID G. SAVAGE, THE SUPREME COURT & INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 1
(4th ed. 2004) (noting the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of equal protection);
Primus, supra note 85, at 101 (noting the "modern vision of constitutionalism on
which equal individual rights are the cornerstone of constitutional law").
134. RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 236 (1999). But
see A.I. Melden, Dignity, Worth, and Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTs 39
(Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) ("For to understand what is in-

volved in having a right . . . is to understand the good reasons, sufficient or not as
these may be, for waiving or relinquishing the right ....
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jurisprudence is that the law must afford equal protection to all," and
the ideal of due process, protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, embodies to our deepest notions of what is just and
fair."' Even in the early years of Reconstruction, following the enaction of the Fourteenth Amendment, there was uniform agreement
that at least civil rights-the rights that people must hold in order to
act as private individuals in civil society, capable of personal independence and self-sufficiency-attached to all persons equally."' It has
long been understood that the government may make classifications
and distinctions in their infringement upon a right,"' but to do so, the
government must overcome the rebuttable presumption that such action is condemnable under the standard of equal protection.1 3 9 It is
important to note that this legislative leeway is to act in such a way
that infringes upon the right, rather than in the act of defining the
right.' 40 If the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments are designed to forbid injustice in the form of capricious
legislative deprivations of life, liberty, or property, then it is reasonable to believe that the Equal Protection Clause is designed to prohibit
135. Edward S. Corwin, The "HigherLaw" Background of American Constitutional
Law, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 67, 72 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989);
accord Louis Henkin, Dignity and Constitutional Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF

210, 215 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) (writing that the
framers built the government on theory "rooted in rights" and embodied in the Declaration of Independence's articulation that "all Men are created equal"); Marc D.
RIGHTS

Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 307, 312

(2010) ("The right to equality has been defined as the most fundamental claim a citizen has against government: the right to be held in equal regard and to be treated
equally by the government."). But see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 484 (1968) (noting that "[a] society char-

acterized by equality among men was, in many ways, the opposite of that in which
[the founders] desired to live"). However, Scharwtz notes that the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees "equality of all persons before the law." Id. at
487.
136. William A. Parent, ConstitutionalValues and Human Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS 66 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992).
137. PRIMus, supra note 134, at 154-55.
138. SCHWARTZ, supra note 135, at 504; see also Parent, supra note 136, at 67
("[O]bviously, this [equal protection] guarantee does not mean that states may draw
no distinctions at all . . . .").
139. See Parent, supra note 136, at 67 (noting the presumption against arbitrary
government discriminations).
140. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3056 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that prudential reasons are not a valid basis to "withhold rights
that are within the Constitution's command"). Cf Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election
Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189-90 (2008) (identifying the right as to be free from the "affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard," and balancing that
right against the offered state interest); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
303 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (defining the relevant liberty as "to engage in a
common calling," but noting that like other liberties, it "may be limited in the exercise
of the police power"); SCHWARTZ, supra note 135, at 473-504 (discussing leeway in
the context of government action affecting an established right).
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injustice in the form of capricious legislative assignments of rights.1 4 '
Further, while equality is not mentioned in the Bill of Rights, there is
an implicit commitment to equality; the rights within the Bill of Rights
are announced for all and invite challenges to practices that interfere
with the equal application of those rights." 2 Every individual is assured the same rights assured others.1 43 While this notion of underlying equality might be dismissed as merely idealistic and
uncompromising for practical considerations, these enduring constitutional principles form the very foundation of our legal system.' As a
result, Justice Stevens' assertion in McDonald that a right "need not
be identical in shape or scope," if adopted, poses a serious challenge
to the underlying promise of equality within the very conception of a

right.145
As noted, the government may make classifications that infringe
upon individual rights. 146 Federal and state interests are properly considered in determining whether the government act infringing upon an
individual right is permissible.' 4 7 Although some, including Justice
Black, have asserted that one of the primary purposes of the Constitution was to withdraw from the government the ability to act in certain
areas, and that there is never a justification for balancing a particular
right against an expressly granted power to the government,14 8 this
141. Cf Parent, supra note 136, at 67. This argument is generally made to overcome suspect classifications based on race, gender, or other "morally irrelevant
grounds," see id. at 70, but the Constitution itself does not limit due process or equal
protection based on racial or similar discrimination. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1
("[N]or shall any State deprive any person ... without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
142. Martha Minow, Equality and the Bill of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
RIGHTS 118 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992). While this is admittedly not a "standard of interpretation" of the Bill of Rights, the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment shares with the "guarantees of orderly legal procedures
throughout the Bill of Rights a demand for equal treatment before the law." Id. at
119-21.
143. Id. at 121.
144. See David A. Richards, Liberty, Dignity, and Justification, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS 100 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) (discussing
the "community of principle"). Cf Jurgen Habermas, ConstitutionalDemocracy, in
PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 177 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 2008) (noting the importance of basic rights that result from the equal actionability of individual rights to
a constitutional democracy).
145. Compare McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3093-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting), with supra
notes 133-44 and accompanying text (discussing rights jurisprudence).
146. Supra note 138 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Respondents the National Rifle Association of
America, Inc. et al in Support of Petitioners as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners

at 14, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2010 WL
360206, at *14 [hereinafter NRA Brief] ("[LJocalized concerns .. . may be relevant to
determining whether certain laws and regulations can withstand the scrutiny of the
courts.").
148. BLACK, supra note 61, at 55.
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view has been consistently rejected by the Court.14 9 In each case
before the Court where a fundamental right is at stake, the Court
makes an independent determination of the legitimacy of the law that
affects that right.'s 0 The Court subjects the action at issue to a strict
scrutiny standard of review, requiring the law to be narrowly tailored
to promote a compelling interest of government if it is to limit the
fundamental rights of citizens.' 5 1 If the Court is not satisfied that the
government action meets this burden, then the Court will find the action unconstitutional.s 2 Strict scrutiny review is said to require the
most exact connection between justification and classification, but the
Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that it is "strict in theory, but
fatal in fact."' 53 On several occasions, the Court has found a state's
interest so compelling and narrowly tailored as to warrant overriding
an individual right."'
The Court's consideration of state interests in rights cases maintains
the delicate constitutional balance between the individual and the
government actor.' 55 This consideration is not only a result of traditional rights jurisprudence," 6 but also stems from principles of federalism embedded in our Constitution."' The Founders sought to create
a government with two spheres wherein the laws of the United States
would be supreme, "as to all their constitutional objects," and the laws
149. This can be seen in First Amendment cases. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (stating that the right
to association may be overcome by compelling state interests that cannot be advanced
through significantly less restrictive means); Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979) (same).
150. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 427 (8th
ed. 2010).
151. See id. at 428. Cf Richards, supra note 2, at 98 ("In effect, the state may
abridge such fundamental rights. . . by showing that the abridgement is indispensable
to some compelling secular state purpose.").
152. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 150, at 428.
153. Campbell, supra note 3, at 397 n.78.
154. Because the Court has not ruled on state infringements of an individual's right
to possess a handgun in the home, looking to other Due Process Clause cases is helpful. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2978 (ruling for the state on claim
that university infringed students' right to associate); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 311, 343 (2003) (ruling for the state on claim that state university admissions
process violated students right to equal protection).
155. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny
review).

156. Cf Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (subjecting government action infringing "strong free speech rights" to strict scrutiny). See
generally Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (discussing
local differences in the context of school desegregation and the right to be free from
discrimination on the basis of race).

157. Cf

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE
CENTURY 106-13 (2008) (arguing that federalism protects liberty). See generally
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987) (exploring federalist

21sT

underpinnings of the Constitution).
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of the states would be supreme in the same way.'1 8 James Madison
described the powers left to the states in our system of joint sovereignty as including "all the objects which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."' One
of federalism's chief virtues is that it promotes innovation by allowing
for the possibility that "a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory, and may try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."' The role of
states as a laboratory is most often noted in the states' core police
powers-the authority to define criminal law and to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.1 6 ' While a right may be
established at the federal level and common across the states, local
police power may limit the exercise of that right.162
However, judicial restraint that defers too much to the sovereign
powers of the states and reserves judicial intervention for only the
most egregious of cases will not protect "the great rights of mankind
secured under [our] Constitution" necessary for freedom to exist.' 6 3
Denying the states the power to impair a fundamental right is not an
increase of federal power; rather, it limits the power of all levels of
government in favor of safeguarding the fundamental rights and liberties of the individual.' Further, after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is much more difficult to argue that federalism
sanctions violation by state actors of individual fundamental rights.'
As a result, the Court may strike down state action, even if under the
158. BERGER, supra note 157, at 58 (quoting 2 JONATHAN ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTI-

355 (2d ed. 1996)) (describing the "two independent spheres of government"
for the United States).
159. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Madison
describes the powers that remain to the state governments as "numerous and indefinite," while those of the federal government are "few and defined." Id.
160. Id. at 42; New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 302 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
161. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
162. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
163. Brennan, supra note 127, at 86. But see THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The power[ I reserved to the several
TUTION

States will extend to ... [the] liberties and properties of the people . .. of the State.").

164. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 170 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
165. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct.
3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521). The Court has not allowed states to act as laboratories of
democracy in the establishment of religion, suppression of the press, racial segregation, regulation of family planning, or intrusion into personal relationships, when fundamental rights are at stake. Id. at *20; accord NRA Brief, supra note 147, at *12-13
(same). But see Baldwin v. Williams, 399 U.S. 117, 133 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(arguing the Fourteenth Amendment tempered federalism but "did not unstitch the
basic federalist pattern woven into our constitutional fabric"). A similar argument
may be made that the Supremacy Clause demands that where there is conflict between federal law and state law, then federal law must prevail. Cf Gonzales, 545 U.S.
at 29 (noting the mandate of the Supremacy Clause in the context of the Commerce
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guise of federalism, which infringes upon fundamental rights and fails
the required degree of scrutiny.' 66
In McDonald, Justice Stevens notes that federalism considerations,
found within constitutional text and structure, suggest that there may
be legitimate reasons to hold state governments to different standards
than the federal government in certain areas.167 His assertion seems
compatible with the Court's federalism jurisprudence at first glance.'16
However, rather than consider federalism and other state and local
concerns in weighing government action against the individual right
infringed upon, as the Court's jurisprudence dictates,' 6 9 Justice Stevens gives weight to these considerations as he determines whether
individuals have the underlying right at the state level. 7 1 Justice Stevens' approach to determining the existence of a right has the effect of
considering state and local interests in both prongs of the test to determine whether government action is constitutional, and as a result, it is
a significant departure from the Court's rights jurisprudence. 7 '
In addition to rejecting several decades of incorporation jurisprudence, Justice Stevens presents a serious challenge to the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence in McDonald.'"2 Although Justice
Stevens claims to base his dissent in McDonald on the "vast corpus of
substantive due process opinions," 7 3 the principles he offers are not
those of the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence.17 4 The
Clause). Further exploration of the Supremacy Clause is beyond the scope of this
Article.
166. See Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 118 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("But to accomplish [federalism] by diluting constitutional protections within the federal system itself is something to which I cannot possibly subscribe."). Cf New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("We may strike down the statute which
embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable."); Eagle Forum Brief, supra note 116, at *3, *8 (arguing that a "full
view" of federalism requires incorporation of fundamental rights because a national
structure can protect against local tyranny).
167. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3093 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
168. See supra notes 155-62 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's federalism jurisprudence).
169. Supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
170. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3112-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting several
concerns: federalism, "the States have a long and unbroken history of regulating firearms," patterns of gun violence in urban versus rural areas, and the states' "right to
experiment").
171. Justice Stevens considers state and local interests while determining whether
the right exists, and traditional analysis would consider these factors again in balancing the government interest against the individual right. Compare supra notes 99, 110
and accompanying text, with supra note 140 and accompanying text (traditional
analysis).
172. Compare McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3090-3103 (Stevens, J., dissenting), with id.
at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring) (addressing Justice Stevens's discussion of substantive
due process).
173. Id. at 3090.
174. Id. at 3050.
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Court has held that the proper inquiry is whether a right is "fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice" and is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.""' Justice Stevens, however, asserts that the proper inquiry is whether the right is
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and whether it contributes
to a "fairand enlightened system of justice.""' Further exploration of
this difference is beyond the scope of this Article, but it suffices to
note that his conception of the Due Process Clause is much broader,
much more global, and much more open to changing norms and values than substantive due process jurisprudence dictates. 7 7
4. Is Justice Stevens Right?
Justice Stevens' dissent in McDonald not only challenges the outcome found by the majority, but proposes fundamental changes to the
Court's constitutional law jurisprudence.' 7 8 Justice Stevens is correct
in his assertion that if a right is incorporated against the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, then the
Court should employ the same test as it applies in other due process
cases."' Doing so provides consistency and a ready framework for future decisions.'8 0 However, any promise of consistency is undermined
by Justice Stevens' broad condemnation of the Court's substantive
due process jurisprudence.' 8 ' Lastly, Justice Stevens' inclusion of government interests, whether national, state, or local, in considering
whether a certain right is encompassed within the meaning of Due
Process is misplaced.' 82 While federalism is a legitimate consideration
in determining the constitutionality of government action, 183 such con175. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
176. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3096 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
177. See generally id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring) (contrasting Justice Stevens'
view of substantive due process law with that of the Court).
178. Supra Section III(C)(3) and accompanying text.
179. Compare McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3092 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he underlying inquiry is the same: We must ask whether the interest is comprised within the
term liberty." (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring))), with Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67-68 (1932) ("It is possible that
some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments . . . may also

be safeguarded against state action ... because they are of such a nature that they are
included in the conception of due process of law." (quoting Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908))). For exploration of incorporation under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see generally McDonald,130 S. Ct. at
3059-88 (Thomas, J., concurring); Neily, supra note 49, at 16.
180. Id. at 3096 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Our precedents have established, not an
exact methodology, but rather a framework for decisionmaking.").
181. Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring).
182. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (rejecting the argument that the scope of the right could be determined by interest balancing).
183. See supra note 161-62 and accompanying text (noting the relationship between local police powers and federalism).
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siderations properly occur in balancing the offered state interest
against the individual right infringed upon. Considering these interests
in defining an individual right, as Justice Stevens suggests, challenges
the fundamental premise of equality that our nation is built upon.1 8 4
As a result, while Justice Stevens' approach in McDonald is well-intended, it is ill-advised.
D.

The Solution: Consider Federalism in the Balancing Test

The portion of Justice Stevens' dissent in McDonald that reminds us
that the Constitution envisions a structure of divided sovereignty
where "local differences are to be cherished as elements of liberty"185
should not be ignored. However, federalism concerns cannot always
triumph and must be weighed against the fundamental rights and
promise of equality protected by the Constitution) 8 6 This delicate balance is best achieved through a three-prong analysis: (1) a commitment to individual rights and equality in the formulation of the right,
(2) the consideration of local interests in identifying the government
interest, and (3) the consideration of federalism in the balancing test
used to determine whether the government action is constitutional.
First, the Court must seek to define the right in terms that allow the
right to be held equally by each individual.' In its definition, the
right should not discriminate on arbitrary grounds,"18 and further, it
should be established with clarity and precision." Once the right at
184. Supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text (highlighting the constitutional
promise of equality).
185. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3093 (2010).
186. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("By considering the particular religious liberty right alleged to be invaded by a State, federal courts can strike a proper balance between the demands of
the Fourteenth Amendment on the one hand and the federalism prerogatives of
States on the other."); Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193,
223-25 (2009) (discussing the balance between federalism and protecting individual
rights); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587 (1999) ("Our Federalism
does not mean blind deference to States' Rights.").
187. Cf Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) ("The identity of the
speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected."); Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 723 (2010) (noting that all individuals facing criminal prosecution
have the right to a speedy and public trial); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd.,
553 U.S. 181, 205-07 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Court must first
identify the burden imposed on the right of all voters, not some voters, before they
can "weigh it" against the state interest).
188. Cf District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) ("[Elnumeration of
the right takes out of the hands of government . .. the power to decide on a case-bycase basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.").
189. Cf Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592 (2010) (defining property rights in and near navigable waters); Abbott v. Abbott,
130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010) (defining parental rights); Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S.
191, 214 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring) (defining the right to counsel); CBOCS West,
Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (identifying rights "specifically defined in
terms of racial equality").

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss3/5
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V19.I3.3

24

Campbell: Can Rights Be Different?: Justice Stevens' Dissent in McDonald v.

2013]

CAN RIGHTS BE DIFFERENT?

757

issue has been defined, the Court can determine if the individual
plaintiff's right has been infringed by the government defendant.'"
Second, the Court must elicit the interest underlying the government's actions.' The interest will likely be an expression of the government's police power-for the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens.' 9 2 The Court should seek to determine the specific government interests at play in the location where the action occurs.' 9 3 For
instance, in the context of firearm regulations, a state might have a
greater interest in preventing death by gunshot or armed robbery in
highly urban areas, while this same interest would not be as plausible
in highly rural areas.' 9 4 Similarly, a state might have a strong interest
in protecting endangered species, children, or young adults on university campuses.19
Finally, after the Court has determined the right at stake and the
government interest, the Court must balance these two competing interests under the proper standard of review, guided by its past holdings.19 6 For instance, assuming that the right to possess a handgun in
the home established in McDonald is fundamental,' 9 7 the Court must
190. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,
445-46 (2008) (first identifying the associational right burdened and then engaging in
strict scrutiny analysis).
191. See, e.g., id. (identifying the state interest after establishing the individual
right).
192. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 720 (2007) (noting the state's interest in remedying past discrimination); Johnson
v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 512 (2005) (identifying the state interest in prison security
and discipline); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996) (noting the state's interest in
offsetting costs of its court system).
193. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181,191 (2008) (noting Indiana's interest in combating voter registration fraud in their state); Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843, 853 (2006) (accepting California's offered interest in supervising its large parolee population).
194. See generally Motion for Leave to File Brief for Law Professor and Students as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020
(2010) (No. 08-1521), 2010 WL 96798 (exploring various state interests in regulating
firearms); Brief for Oak Park Citizens Comm. for Handgun Control as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No.
08-1521), 2010 WL 128013 (same).
195. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (discussing state interests).
196. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 3, at 395-96 (noting that where there is discrimination on the basis of race, the Court will require a compelling state interest to uphold government action); Jessica M. Wiles, Have Native Americans Been Written Out
of The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 71 MONT. L. REv. 471, 476 (2010) ("action

that impinges on . . . the Free Exercise Clause must be balanced against a compelling

state interest"); Mariama A. Jefferson, Reproductive Choice: The Reproductive Choice
Debate Must Include More Than Abortion, 4 CHARLESTON L. REv. 773, 786 (2010)

(discussing the balancing of state interests with the individual right to privacy).
197. See generally Lindsey Craven, Where Do We Go From Here? Handgun Regulation in a Post-Heller World, 18 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 831, 841-44 (2010) (argu-

ing that Heller indicates a move toward strict scrutiny). Further exploration of the
appropriate degree of scrutiny to infringements on the Second Amendment right is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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then ask if the law at issue is narrowly tailored to promote a compelling interest of the government.' 1 While the Court has not provided a
clear definition of what actions are narrowly tailored, it is clear that
the classification must be narrowly tailored to the interest in question,
rather than be pursued in a far reaching, inconsistent, and ad hoc
manner, and it must be supported by a detailed evidentiary showing.' 1 In addition, the Court has provided a far-from-exhaustive list of
compelling interests necessary to overcome strict scrutiny; instead, the
Court engages in a case-by-case analysis of government action and the
offered interest.2" Within this case-by-case analysis, the Court may
consider federalism concerns, including the strength of the state's interest in regulating within the area at issue.20 1
As applied to the incorporation of the Second Amendment addressed by the Court in McDonald, this approach would first find that
an equal right to possess a handgun in the home is held by every citizen of every state through the Fourteenth Amendment.2 0 2 Second, although this right is equally possessed by all, some states might have
more compelling interests than others in regulating the possession of
handguns. 20 3 Finally, federalism principles will be used in the balancing test to determine whether the government action is constitutional,
as the court will ask whether the state's actions are narrowly tailored
to a compelling interest.20 4 At a minimum, based on the Court's holdings in Heller and McDonald, it is clear that a regulation that practically eliminates any individual's ability to possess a handgun is not
narrowly tailored.20 5 In some states, this interest may be so compelling
and narrowly tailored as to override the individual's right, and the
state government may restrict what type of gun the individual can own
198. Compare supra note 36 and accompanying text (holding of McDonald), with
supra notes 150-151 and accompany text (standard of review for fundamental right).
199. Campbell, supra note 3, at 397 & nn.79-80.
200. Id. at 397, n.79.
201. See generally Ryan Griffin, Litigating the Contours of Constitutionality: Harmonizing Equitable Principlesand Constitutional Values When Considering Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 94 MINN. L. REV. 839 (2010) (noting federalism interests at

stake in a case concerning medical professional regulations); The Supreme Court, 2008
Term-Leading Cases, 123 HARv. L. REV. 192 (2009) (discussing federalism concerns
at stake in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)).

202. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (finding that the
right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense applies equally
to the states).
203. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text (noting possible state
interests).
204. See supra notes 196 and accompanying text.
205. Compare supra text accompanying notes 36 (incorporating the Second
Amendment right), with District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821-22
(2008) (striking down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home). See also Jeffrey M. Shaman, After Heller: What Now for the Second Amendment?, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1095, 1105 (2010) (noting that the

Second Amendment "preclud[es] laws that prohibit possession of handguns that may
be used for self-defense in the home").
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or where they may carry it. 2 0 6 As a result, while the individual right is
consistent from state to state, local interests may dictate that the regulations on handguns differ from state to state, and a citizen may not be
able to exercise his right to that same degree in every state.2 0 7
This proposed three-prong method of analysis will allow the Court
to maintain the delicate balance between the constitutional promises
of fundamental rights, equality, and local interests. As weight is given
to each relevant consideration, the full promise of federalism will be
realized, protecting both individual and state autonomy. 208
IV.

CONCLUSION

The framers of the Constitution not only believed strongly in the
importance of a limited government, with a system of checks and balances for the prevention of tyranny, 20 9 but also appreciated the delicate balance between the rights of individuals and the powers of their
government. 210 They knew that if the individual rights secured by the
Bill of Rights were to have meaning, then every individual must have
the ability to challenge practices that interfere with the equal application of those rights. 2 "
The majority's opinion in McDonald and the Court's recent jurisprudence leave little doubt that the Court's commitment to equality
before the law is no different than that of the founders.2 12 Further, at
least a majority of the Court is unwilling to find that rights may differ
in scope from one location to another as Justice Stevens advocates.2 u
When the proper case 2 1 4 comes before the Court, the Court would be
well advised to clarify that the proper role of federalism in individual
rights cases is in determining the state interest, not in defining the
right.2 15
206. See supra notes 162, 197 and accompanying text.
207. Craven, supra note 197, at 844-55 (exploring regulations likely to be challenged on Second Amendment grounds).
208. See supra notes 157-66 and accompanying text.
209. Cf Richards, supra note 2, at 91 (identifying federalism, separation of powers,
and judicial review as the "three great structures of American constitutionalism").
210. See id. at 75 ("The American idea of constitutionalism rests on . . . equal ina-

lienable rights and a constitutional theory of the constraints on political power required for those rights to be respected.").
211. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
212. Compare McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 (2010), with
Campbell, supra note 3, at 421 (beliefs of the original framers). See also Cahn, supra
note 48, at 3 ("What America promised must be nothing less than a new kind of
society-fresh, equal, just, open, free . . . .").
213. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
214. "Proper" is used to mean a case where the individual right at issue has been
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
there is disagreement among lower courts as to the content of the individual right at
issue.
215. See supra Part Ill.D.
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